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tee of trustworthiness of the record itself,
and upon the inconvenience and well-nigh
impossibility of producing witnesses who
could from their own personal knowledge
testify to the truth of the entries made."
152 Md. 439, 446, 137 A. 43, 45 (1925).
Globe emphasized that from the hospital's
standpoint
there could be no more important
record than the chart which indicates
the diagnosis, the condition, and treatment of the patients. . .. It is difficult
to conceive why this record should not
be reliable. There is no motive for the
person, whose duty it is to make the
entries, to do other than record them
correctly and accurately.

Id. at 446-47, 137 A. at 46.
This theory is codified as Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-101 (1987 Repl.
Vol.). This statute declares
(a) ... "Business" includes business,
profession, and occupation of every
kind.
(b) ... A writing or record made in the
regular course of business as a memorandum or record of an event is admissible to prove the act, transaction,
occurrence, or event.
(c) ... The practice of the business
must be to make such written records
of its acts at the time they are done or
within a reasonable, time afterwards.
(d) ... The lack of personal knowledge
of the maker of the written notice may
be shown to affect the weight of the
evidence but not its admissibility.
In Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard 'U.
Scherpenisse, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland included hospital records within
the scope of this statute, explaining that
the statute's purpose was to broaden the
rule of evidence that limited one's testimony to what was personally known or
observed. 187 Md. 375, 381,50 A.2d 256,
260 (1946). Some entries within hospital
records, however, have been declared inadmissible. Gregory 'U. State held that this legislation did not extend to a document
containing a psychiatrist's opinion of an
individual's mental capacity or criminal
responsibility. 40 Md. App. 297, 325, 391
A.2d 437, 454 (1978).
Based on its review of the aforementioned authorities, the Garlick court concluded
that the "pathologically germane" entries
in hospital records are generally admissible
because they are part of a hospital's
"regular course of business." 313 Md. at
223, 545 A.2d at 33. The U.S. Supreme
Court declared in Palmer 'U. Hoffman that

"regular course" of business finds "its
meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question and in the methods systematically employed for the conduct of
the business as a business." 318 U.S. 109,
115 (1943). The court of appeals cited with
approval the dissenting opinion of New
York Life Ins. 'U. Taylor, which reasoned
that a hospital's "regular course of business" is the treatment of patients. In order
to fullfill this obligation, a hospital
methodically maintains a record. Otherwise, a hospital cannot render adequate
treatment. 147 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir.
1945).
The court of appeals also relied upon the
holding in Pratt 'U. State that the information within a hospital record is admissible
"as long as it is pathologically germane."
39 Md. App. 442, 455, 387 A.2d 779, 787
(1978), affd, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421
(1979). It then determined that" 'pathologically germane' ... includes facts helpful
to an understanding of the medical or surgical aspects of the case, within the scope
of medical inquiry." 313 Md. at 222, 545
A.2d at 33.
After establishing this premise, the court
sought to determine whether Garlick's
hospital record was prepared in the
"regular course of business" and if its contents were "pathologically germane" to
his condition. If so, the document could be
admitted into evidence under the hearsay
rule exception.
Therefore, the significant facts of the
case were recounted. The emergency room
doctor examining Garlick ordered the
blood and urine tests to understand why
the patient responded poorly in his neurological exam. The doctor was not present
when the blood sample was taken, nor was
he aware of the identity of the hospital
employee who conducted the tests. In
addition, he was not aware whether the
equipment performing the tests had been
recently inspected, nor was he aware if the
testing procedure itself conformed with
routine practice. Nonetheless, the doctor
testified that he had every confidence in
the veracity of the test results.
It was noted that the doctor did not have
litigation in mind when he ordered the
blood sample taken. The sample was tested
by the hospital and not by the police.
There was no reason to doubt the record
on its face. Considerations of utility and
convenience outweighed the probative
value behind pursuing the testimony of
every medical staff member who examined
either Garlick or his blood. The court concluded, "The examining doctor relied on
these objective scientific findings for Garlick's treatment and never doubted their
trustworthiness. Neither do we." 313 Md.

at 225-26, 545 A.2d at 35.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland paid
particular attention to the facts in distinguishing Garlick's situation from that in
Moon. It recognized that Garlick's test
results constituted "pathologically germane" entries in a hospital record prepared within the hospital's "regular course
of business." This information, in light of
the circumstances, satisfied the Afoon
requirement of substantial reliability. The
Garlick court, 'therefore, understood that
Moon was unique in its facts, and reinforced the trend that existed before the
Moon decision. Thus, Maryland continues
to recognize that one's right to confront
his accuser is not violated by admitting
into evidence a hospital record containing
laboratory test results, even though the
technician administering those tests is not
called to testify.

- Gregory R. Smouse

Scbocbet 'U. State: STATUTE
PROHIBITING UNNATURAL AND
PERVERTED SEXUAL PRACTICES
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGID TO
PRIVACY WHEN APPLIED TO A
PRIVATE SEXUAL ACT BETWEEN
CONSENTING, UNMARRIED,
HETEROSEXUAL ADULTS
In Schochet 'U. State, 75 Md. App. 314,541
A.2d 183 (1988), the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland recently held that a
statute which prohibits unnatural and
perverted sexual practices, Md. Ann. Code
art. 27, §554 (1957), does not violate the
constitutional right to privacy when it is
applied to private acts of fellatio between
consenting,
unmarried,
heterosexual
adults.
Eight separate charges were filed against
Steven Adam Schochet based upon three
alleged sexual episodes stemming from an
alleged rape. Schochet was acquitted of all
six charges involving force and the lack of
consent of the victim and of a seventh
charge of sodomy. He was convicted only
of a violation of Article 27, §554, which
prohibits among other things, the act of
fellatio, which is considered an "unnatural
and perverted sexual practice." Schochet
appealed the conviction on the issue of the
constitutionality of §554 as applied to consenting, unmarried, heterosexual adults.
To begin its analysis, the court of special
appeals examined whether Schochet had
standing to raise the constitutional issue of
whether there is some substantive due process right of privacy shielding him from
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state regulation of noncommercial, consensual, private and adult sexual activity.
The court held that the appellant was not
disentitled to raise the issue in any regard,
because there is no suggestion that the act
of fellatio in question was commercial,
public or involved a minor. In addition,
the evidence clearly permitted a finding
that the act was consensual; thus, the
appellant was entitled to a ruling on the
con.qitutionality of the statute as applied
to a private act between consenting,
unmarried, heterosexual adults. Schochet,
75 Md. App. at 319, 541 A.2d at 185.
Next, the court examined into which
class of persons the appellant would fall.
They stated that there are three significant
classes: 1) a homosexual couple (male or
female), 2) an unmarried heterosexual couple, or 3) a married heterosexual couple.
They then noted that one class has been
found to have no constitutional right of
privacy in their sex lives. "It is now clear
beyond room for disagreement that the
Supreme Court has announced that there
is no constitutional right of privacy to
engage in homosexual acts." ld. at 319-20,
541 A.2d at 185 (citing Doe v. Com·

monwealth's Attorney for City of Rich·
mond, 425 U.S. 901 (1986), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986».
Since the issue before the court of special
appeals concerned unmarried heterosexuals, and because there has been no direct
statement concerning a right of privacy for
such a class, the court undertook an analysis of the development of the right to
privacy to determine if the Supreme Court
has stated anything that would suggest that
§554 is unconstitutional as applied to
unmarried heterosexuals.
The court found that the scope of the
right to privacy and the limitations upon
the right have been enumerated in a few
key cases. The forerunner of the newly
recognized right of privacy stressed the
intimacy of the marital relation as the basis
of the protection and "identified the institution of marriage as 'a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.''' Schachet at 323, 541 A.2d at 187
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 301 U.S.
479, 485 (1965». The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland found that it is clear
that, in reference to "the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms," the presence of the
qualifying adjective "marital" by the
Supreme Court was not inadvertent. The
court concluded that the critical difference
between the bedroom protected in
Griswold and the bedroom not protected
in Bowers v. Hardwick is that the bedroom
in Griswold was a marital bedroom, while
the bedroom in Bowers was not. Schachet

at 324, 541 A2d at 187-88.
The reasoning of the court was that the
right to sexual privacy should be applied
only to married couples. The court went
on to state that:
On the basis of Griswold v. Connecti·
cut and (the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan in) Poe v. Ullman, the
possibility arises that the reason the
plaintiffs in Bowers v. Hardwick were
barred from the coverage of the right
to privacy was because their sexual
intimacy lacked the unique imprimatur of the marital union, not because it
lacked the quality of heterosexuality.

ld. at 325, 541 A.2d at 188.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland further examined these Supreme
Court cases and found that the majority
had tightly narrowed the right of privacy
"to a few select subjects, which did not
include sexual relations of any sort by
anyone outside of marriage ... " ld. at 327,
541 A2d at 189.
Our prior decisions recognizing a right
to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included only personal rights that can be deemed
fundamental or implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.... This privacy
right encompasses and protects the
personal intimacies of the home, the
family, marriage, motherhood, pr<r
creation, and child rearing.

ld. at 327, 541 A.2d at 189 (quoting Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65
(1973».
The court went on to examine the pivotal case of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), which appellant Schochet argued as
holding that whatever right of privacy was
recognized for married couples in
Griswold is to be extended broadly to
unmarried persons as well. The court concluded that "the opinion, on careful reading, simply does not stand for that."
Schachet, 75 Md. App. 327-28, 541 A.2d at
189. In the court's opinion, the language of
Eisenstadt v. Baird, relied on by the appellant, deals not with a broad right to
privacy, but is limited to matters concerning the decision of whether to have a child:
"'If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.'"
Schachet, 75 Md. App. at 328,541 A.2d at
189-90 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. at 453).

The court of special appeals went on to
conclude that Eisenstadt is not primarily a
due process case, but an equal protection
case, and that "it strongly suggests that if
the purpose of the law was to discourage
sexual relations outside of marriage, a legislative discrimination between married persons would be a rational one ... " Schachet
at 331-32, 541 A.2d at 191-92.
Based on the readings of these cases, the
court found that there was no evidence
that the right to privacy covers the sexual
activity of consenting, unmarried, heterosexual adults. "That right covers the intimacy of the marital union; and decisions
dealing with procreation, contraception
and abortion. There is not the remotest
allusion to any constitutional protection
for sexual activity... outside of marriage." ld. at 339, 541 A.2d at 198. The
court held that in the absence of any such
indication, Article 27, §554 is constitutional as applied to unmarried persons.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland went on to find that their holding was fully consistent with their own
prior rulings and the prior rulings of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland as to the
constitutionality of §554.
It is thus clear that the Supreme Court
has yet to extend the right to privacy
much beyond the context of intimate
relationships. It is not, therefore, coextensive with every intrusion actionable
under the tort of invasion of privacy,
nor does it protect rights merely
important and not fundamental.

ld. at 349, 541 A.2d at 200 (quoting
j,lontgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502,
512-13, 336 A.2d 97, 105 (1975».
Appellant also attempted to argue that
due to the "sexual revolution," modes of
sexual expression that were once thought
to be "unnatural" are now part of everyday life with a significant majority of
Americans, married and unmarried, heterosexual and homosexual. The court agreed
that may be true, but suggested that such
an argument should be delivered to the legislature rather than the court. "Unless we
are to usurp the legislative function under
the guise of constitutional interpretation,
we refer such basic policy decisions to the
branch that is more competent to make
them and, is furthermore constitutionally
authorized to make them." Schachet at 350,
541 A.2d at 201.
The decision handed down by the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland in Schachet
narrows the right to privacy in sexual acts
as applied by the Supreme Court. Where
the Supreme Court has held that there is
no right to privacy to engage in homo-
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sexual acts. the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has clearly stated that no such
right exists for the sexual acts of consenting, unmarried, heterosexual adults.
According to the court, the right to
privacy for sexual acts applies only to married adults.

- Leo]. Keenan, III

Niroo v. Niroo:
ANTICIPATED RENEWAL
COMMISSIONS ON INSURANCE
POLICIES SOLD BY A SPOUSE

DURING TIlE MARRIAGE ARE
MARITAL PROPERTY
In Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d
35 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that anticipated renewal
commissions on insurance policies sold by
a spouse during the marriage but accruing
after the marriage are marital property
within the meaning of the Property Disposition in Divorce Annulment Act (the
Act), Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §8-201(e)
(1984).
The Niroos were married in 1977. In
1978, Mr. Niroo became an insurance
salesman for Pennsylvania Life Insurance
Company (penn Life), where he received
commissions on individual policies sold. In
1980, he entered into agency manager
agreements with Penn Life and the Executive Fund Life Insurance Company. Under
these agreements, Mr. Niroo shared in the
profits and the losses of the company. The
agreements entitled him to receive income
derived from net profits generated from
the renewal of insurance policies. Furthermore, the contracts specified that the husband's right to these renewal commissions
"shall be vested in him even if he is permanently and totally disabled, or after his
death in his heirs and assigns." 313 Md. at
229, 545 A.2d at 36.
At trial, Mr. Niroo contended that the
commissions were not marital property as
defined by the Act. Alternatively, he contended that if the commissions were deemed marital property, then the value of the
commissions were offset by advances he
had drawn against future commissions
which should properly have been construed as marital property. The trial judge
disagreed on both counts, holding the
commissions were marital property and
that the debt he had incurred could not be
offset against the commissions. The court
awarded Mrs. Niroo a $200,000 monetary
award.Id. at 229-30, 545 A.2d at 37.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari in this case prior to the

case's consideration by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in order to "consider the important question involved in
this case." Id. at 230, 545 A.2d at 37. On
appeal, Mr. Niroo asserted that the "speculative and contingent nature of these
commissions" rendered him a tenuous
property interest which was not within
the definition of marital property as contemplated by the legislature in section 8201(e). Id. at 232, 545 A.2d at 38. Because
he had to "work" these accounts through
activities which would take place after the
marriage was dissolved, Mr. Niroo argued
that the commissions were not "acquired"
during the marriage. He therefore contended that "the classification of renewal
commissions as marital property would
improperly give his former wife the fruits
of his future efforts and would penalize
him if the renewal commissions were not
realized." Id.
The court of appeals did not agree, and
it affirmed the holding of the trial court
that the commissions were marital property. It reiterated its conclusion that the Act
significantly changed traditional notions
of property rights between spouses and
broadened the concept of marital property.Id. at 229, 545 A.2d at 37. Marital property may be "'construed to include
obligations, rights and other intangibles as
well as physical things.'" Id. at 233, 545
A.2d at 38 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180
Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767, (1942». The
proper analysis to determine marital property was, "first, to decide whether the
property right was acquired during the
marriage and second, whether it is equitable to include it as marital property,
without regard to whether the right is
vested or not." Niroo at 233, 545 A.2d at
38-39 (citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md.
115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981». Despite Mr.
Niroo's claim that after the dissolution of
the marriage he must still "service" these
accounts in order to realize the renewal
commissions, the court held that "[t]he
husband's primary effort was expended in
acquiring the original policies." Niroo at
235, 545 A.2d at 40. Furthermore, the
court of appeals referred to the evidence
presented at trial which showed that the
commissions were not found to be speculative. Evidence showed that "72% of
existing policies will be automatically
renewed after the first year; 82% ... the
second year; and 88% will be renewed
thereafter." Id. Thus, the court held that
the property right to these commissions
was manifestly vested during the marriage,
and was, therefore, enforceable as marital
property.
Moreover, the court of appeals stated
that it was settled that an insurance agent

has a vested right in renewal commissions.
Id. at 234-35,545 A.2d at 39 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 185,
140 A. 64 (1928». Thus, "contractually
vested rights in renewal commissions are a
type of property interest within the definition of marital property under section 8201(e)." Niroo at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. This
right was established in Mr. Niroo's agency contract with Penn Life, which provided that should he "die or become disabled,
his right to receive the renewal commissions, as well as his heirs' rights thereto,
would not be affected." Id. at 235, 545
A.2d at 39. The court reasoned that
because the husband had a vested right in
the commissions, they were a valuable
asset "not separable from the original policies sold during the marriage, and thus
properly a part of the couple's shared
assets during the marriage." Id. at 237,545
A.2d at 40.
Although the court of appeals noted that
the Act expanded the concept of marital
property, the court did note that some
rights and interests were not includable as
marital property. Among these are an
inchoate personal injury claim arising
from an accident during the marriage,
which it considered as so "uniquely personal that it could not be considered marital property 'acquired' during the marriage
..•. " Id. at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. Also
excluded from the definition of marital
property was a medical degree or license,
which the court considered a "mere
expectancy of future enhanced income ...
personal to the holder [and] cannot be
transferred, pledged or inherited." Archer
v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,357,493 A.2d 1074
(1985). Despite Mr. Niroo's contention
that the renewal commissions were so
uniquely personal as to disqualify them as
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